1 Amy Guan, “6 Points to Consider Before Betting the Farm on ‘All Made in China,’” EE Times, November 15, 2020.
2 State Council (China), National Integrated Circuit Industry Development Guidelines (国家集成电路产业发展推进纲要), June 24, 2014.
3 State Council, “The National IC Industry Investment Fund is Officially Launched,” October 14, 2014.
4 State Council, “Notice on Made in China 2025,” May 8, 2015.
5 For more on the A-Team, see Dieter Ernst, “China’s Bold Strategy for Semiconductors—Zero Sum Game or Catalyst for Cooperation?,” East-West Center, September 2016.
6 Chinese Academy of Engineering, “China Manufacturing 2025 Key Area Technology Roadmap,” October 2015.
7 For an excellent analysis of MIC2025 that includes the CAE report, see European Chamber, China Manufacturing 2025: Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of Market Forces (March 7, 2017).
8 Penny Pritzker, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker Delivers Major Policy Address on Semiconductors at Center for Strategic and International Studies,” U.S. Department of Commerce, November 2, 2016.
9 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (March 22, 2018).
10 Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,” Federal Register 84, no. 196 (October 9, 2019): 54002; Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity List,” Federal Register 84, no. 98 (May 21, 2019): 22961; Bureau of Industry and Security, “Commerce Department to Add Two Dozen Chinese Companies with Ties to WMD and Military Activities to the Entity List,” U.S. Department of Commerce, May 22, 2020; Bureau of Industry and Security, “Commerce Department to Add Nine Chinese Entities Related to Human Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to the Entity List, U.S. Department of Comerce, May 22, 2020; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Addition of Entities to the Entity List and Revision of an Entry on the Entity List,” Federal Register 84, no. 121 (June 24, 2019): 29371; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Addition of Huawei Non-U.S. Affiliates to the Entity List, the Removal of Temporary General License, and Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule),” Federal Register 85, no. 162 (August 20, 2020): 51596; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Export Administration Regulations: Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List,” Federal Register 85, no. 97 (May 19, 2020): 29849.
11 Dieter Ernst, “China’s Bold Strategy for Semiconductors.”
12 Tsinghua Holdings, which owns 51 percent of Unigroup, is fully owned by Xi’s alma mater, Tsinghua University. A group close to Xi at Tsinghua helps to drive the sprawling business empire of Tsinghua University, which some have called Tsinghua Inc.
13 Narayanan Somasundaram and Kenji Kawase, “Tsinghua Unigroup’s Bond Default: Five Things to Know,” Nikkei Asia, December 11, 2020.
14 Company reports and filings.
15 In late December 2020, Loongson was preparing for an IPO, to become the first domestic CPU producer to list on the Shanghai nasdaq-style STAR market, an example of one key new element of China’s semiconductor industry strategy. See: Ze Zhanqi and Ding Yi, “Homegrown CPU Maker Loongson Eyes First-in-Class Listing in China,” Caixin, December 31, 2020. Most of the critical workloads running on Loongson processors are industrial embedded applications.
16 Paul Triolo and Jimmy Goodrich, “From Riding a Wave to Full Steam Ahead: As China’s Government Mobilizes for AI Leadership, Some Challenges Will Be Tougher Than Others,” New America, February 27, 2018.
17 For an excellent and in-depth look at China’s AI specific semiconductor space, see Dieter Ernst, “Competing in Artificial Intelligence Chips: China’s Challenge amid Technology War,” Center for International Governance Innovation, March 26, 2020.
18 Dieter Ernst, “China’s Bold Strategy for Semiconductors.”
19 Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling, and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to Cancel China Chip-Equipment Sale: Sources,” Reuters, January 6, 2020. Details of the U.S. government effort remain scarce, but it appears to have begun around 2018 after the Dutch government agreed to provide a license to sell EUV equipment to SMIC. The status of the equipment remains unclear, and neither ASML nor SMIC has clarified the status of the purchase.
20 See, for example, “Heavy! Based on the Take-Off 2000 Plus Domestic High-Performance Server Product Group Released,” eetop, May 8, 2019.
21 See, for example, “Four Grid Intersection ‘Asset Management Digital Platfrom’ through the PK System Certification,” Sohu, December 8, 2020.
22 See, for example, “Empower New Infrastructure! Take-Off’s Strongest Server CPU Tengyun S2500 Release: UP to 8 512 Cores,” ICSmart, July 24, 2020.
23 Naomi Xu Elegant, “China’s National Champion Chipmaker Becomes Its Biggest Listing in a Decade,” Fortune, July 16, 2020.
24 State Council, “Several Policies Concerning the Promotion of the High Quality Development of the Integrated Circuit Industry and Software Industry in the New Era,” August 4, 2020.
25 State Council, “Communiqué of 5th Plenary Session of 19th CPC Central Committee Released,” October 30, 2020.
26 Lucas Niewenhuis, “China Pushes for Technological Self-Sufficiency to Power Growth through 2035 and Hints at Xi Jinping’s Long-Term Plans,” SupChina, October 29, 2020.
27 “Communiqué of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Xinuanet, October 29, 2020.
28 Kathrin Hille, Yuan Yang, and Liu Qianer, “Huawei Develops Plan for Chip Plant to Help Beat U.S. Sanctions,” Financial Times, October 31, 2020.
29 Paul Triolo and Kevin Allison, “The Geopolitics of Semiconductors,” Eurasia Group, September 2020.
30 “Commerce Adds China’s SMIC to the Entity List, Restricting Access to Key Enabling U.S. Technology,” U.S. Department of Commerce, December 18, 2020.
31 “DOD Releases List of Additional Companies, in Accordance with Section 1237 of FY99 NDAA,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 3, 2020.
32 “Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies,” Executive Office of the President, November 12, 2020.
33 For more on DUV challenges, see Triolo and Allison, “The Geopolitics of Semiconductors.”
34 He Shujing, Luo Guoping, and Yang Ge, “In Depth: Clash of Two Tech Whizzes Reflects Leading Chipmaker SMIC at Crossroads,” Caixin, December 31, 2020.
35 This argument was first articulated by the semiconductor industry here: Jimmy Goodrich, “China’s 13th Five-Year Plan Opportunities & Challenges For the U.S. Semiconductor Industry: Written Testimony Prepared for the U.S. – China Economic & Security Review Commission,” China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (Washington: United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 27, 2016).
36 OECD, “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: The Semiconductor Value Chain,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 234 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019).
37 “Addition of Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Company, Ltd (Jinhua) to the Entity List,” U.S. Department of Commerce, October 29, 2019.
38 Roslyn Layton, “China Aims to Dominate Flash Memory,” Forbes, January 4, 2021.
39 Bureau of Industry and Security, “Addition of Huawei.”
40 For further implications and risks around this, Triolo and Allison, “The Geopolitics of Semiconductors.”
41 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Scott Kennedy, “Washington’s China Policy Has Lost Its Wei,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 27, 2020.
42 Luo Guoping, Liu Leilin, and Anniek Bao, “Beijing to Inexperienced Companies: Stay Out of Chipmaking,” Caixin, October 21, 2020.
43 Guoping, Leilin, and Bao.
44 See, for example, Douglas B. Fuller, “Growth, Upgrading and Limited Catch-up in China’s Semiconductor Industry,” Policy Regulation, and Innovation in China’s Electricity and Telecom Industries, ed. Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
45 Luo Guoping and Yang Ge, “China’s $18.5 Billion Chip Champ Hopeful Fights for Survival,” Caixin, August 25, 2020.
46 As of late 2020, two massive Tsinghua Unigroup memory projects, a 3-D NAND flash facility in Chengdu, and a DRAM production plant in Chonqing are facing delays as a result of both technology and talent related issues, particularly lack of skilled management and heavy dependence on government funding.
47 “Huawei, Other Chinese Tech Firms Are Said to Seek Curbs on Nvidia’s US$40 Billion Arm Acquisition,” South China Morning Post, October 21, 2020.
48 Dan Wang, “New U.S. Restrictions Will Help Make China Great Again,” Bloomberg, December 18, 2020.
49 For an excellent discussion on this issue, see “Webinar Examining China’s Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency: Present and Future Prospects,” Semiconductor Industry Association, November 17, 2020.