1 Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
2 See Daniel A. Bell, “Reconciling Confucianism and Socialism?: Reviving Tradition in China,” Dissent 57, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 91–99; Doh Chull Shin, Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Tianjian Shi, The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
3 Melanie Manion, Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
4 See, for example, Andrei Lungu, “Xi Jinping Has Quietly Chosen His Own Successor,” Foreign Policy, October 20, 2017.
5 Pierre F. Landry and Mingming Shen, “Reaching Migrants in Survey Research: The Use of the Global Positioning System to Reduce Coverage Bias in China,” Political Analysis 13, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 1–22.
6 Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, “Social Reaction to Reform in Urban China,” Problems of Post-Communism 43, no. 6 (January 1996): 35–47; and Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform: The Changing Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
7 The seventeen institutions included in the 2000 WVS are churches, armed forces, education system, the press, the labor union, the police, parliament, civil services, the social security system, television, the government, political parties, major companies, environmental protection organizations, women’s organizations, the health care system, and the justice system. The five key political institutions include parliament, the civil service, the legal system, the police, and the army. The average institutional trust score for each country divides the total trust score in seventeen institutions by the number of relevant questions asked (i.e., relevant institutions) in each country. See Qing Yang and Wenfang Tang, “Exploring the Sources of Institutional Trust in China: Culture, Mobilization, or Performance?,” Asian Politics and Policy 2, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 415–36.
8 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (May 2013): 326–43.
9 David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert, and William Franko, “Voters, Emotions, and Race in 2008: Obama as the First Black President,” Political Research Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2010): 875–89.
10 Wenfang Tang, with Yang Zhang, “Political Trust: An Experimental Study,” chap. 8 in Wenfang Tang, Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Stability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
11 As articulated by authors such as Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Robert D. Putnam in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ronald Inglehart in “Trust, Well-Being and Democracy,” chap. 4 in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Francis Fukuyama in Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1996).
12 Rory Truex, review of Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability, by Wenfang Tang, Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 617–18.
13 See Andrew Jacobs, “Village Revolts over Inequities of Chinese Life,” New York Times, December 15, 2011; and Andrew Jacobs, “Harassment and Evictions Bedevil Even China’s Well-Off,” New York Times, October 28, 2011.
14 See Geoffrey A. Fowler and Juliet Ye, “Chinese Bloggers Score a Victory against the Government,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2008; “Chef’s Death Sparks Riots,” Radio Free Asia, July 22, 2009; Austin Ramzy, “Protests Return to Wukan, Chinese Village That Once Expelled Its Officials,” New York Times, June 20, 2016; Tania Branigan, “Anti-Pollution Protestors Halt Construction of Copper Plant in China,” Guardian, July 3, 2012; Jane Perlez, “Waste Project Is Abandoned Following Protests in China,” New York Times, July 29, 2012.
15 Tang, Populist Authoritarianism.
16 Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
17 Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei, Social Protest in Contemporary China, 2003–2010: Transitional Pains and Regime Legitimacy (New York: Routledge, 2014).
18 Peter L. Lorentzen, “Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8, no. 2 (2013): 127–58.
19 Wenfang Tang, with Joseph (Yingnan) Zhou and Ray Ou Yang, “Political Trust in China and Taiwan,” chap. 5 in Tang, Populist Authoritarianism.
20 See Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Shi, Cultural Logic; and Shin, Confucianism.
21 Tang, with Zhou and Yang, “Political Trust in China and Taiwan.”
23 Tong and Lei, Social Protest in Contemporary China.
24 Also see Zhu Yunhan, “Zhengquan Hefaxing Laiyuan yu Zhongguo Moshi Zhenglun” (working paper, 2016).
25 For the Polity Score, see Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013 (available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
26 For the country scores by Freedom House, see Freedom in the World 2017: Table of Country Scores, https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores.
27 The best studies on the relationship between formal and informal politics can be found in Elizabeth J. Perry’s 2001 research on urban protest, “Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China,” Critical Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (2001): 163–80; and in Lily Tsai’s work on the interaction between formal and informal institutions in rural public goods provision: see her Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (May 2007): 355–72. See also the study of informal personal ties embedded in the CCP’s formal organizations, by Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 1 (February 2012): 166–87.
28 Subjective democracy index is a score based on factor analysis combining six questions related to the respondents’ feelings about the level of democracy, functioning of democracy, freedom of speech, media trust, government responsiveness, and satisfaction of government performance. The six items are highly correlated and therefore possible to be combined into a single index.