“There’s no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons. We already have so many,” President Donald Trump recently said, “you could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over. And here we are building new nuclear weapons, and they’re building nuclear weapons.”1 His instinctive opposition to nuclear weapons or nuclear proliferation isn’t particularly novel and has been publicly stated several times. He has suggested that the United States is spending too much on nuclear weapons, that China is predicted to catch up, and no one will be using the weapons anyway, as that will lead to Armageddon.
President Trump also recently stated in a Fox News appearance that nuclear weapons are “big monsters” and the world’s “greatest existential threat.”2 He has since then publicly supported the Golden Dome initiative, essentially a multidomain hemispheric nuclear shield.3 He has also repeatedly demonstrated his desire to have nuclear arms reduction talks with both Russia and China, once the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine are no longer the primary concerns.
It can be cautiously argued that Trump truly views great power equilibrium as his peace-building legacy, albeit from a position of power, not dissimilar to that of Britain in the post-Napoleonic European balance. “One of the first meetings I want to have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia. And I want to say: ‘Let’s cut our military budget in half.’ And we can do that. And I think we’ll be able to.”4
The task of this essay is to briefly explore the theoretical framework of an America First grand strategy and to attempt to translate the president’s instincts into concrete nuclear policy. The purpose is not to delve into deep tactical or moral questions but rather to elaborate on how an America First Nuclear strategy might be conceptualized: establishing such an understanding may provide a starting point for future debates.
This essay will argue: first, that there is a mild but important theoretical contradiction at the heart of the America First approach toward great power politics; and second, that in nuclear strategy, counterintuitively, there might be more continuity and convergence with traditional American strategic thinking. It will argue as well that the current “burden-shifting” approach outlined by the administration is the perfect compromise position. The essay will conclude with a brief policy recommendation for an eventual tripartite engagement with Russia and China on nuclear arms limitation.
An America First Rationale
The baseline principle of an American realist grand strategy is perpetual, as Hans Morgenthau once realized:
We have conceived the two wars which we fought essentially as two holy crusades, engaged in by a good people against an evil one. It so happened, that what was really at stake in those crusades was not at all the extirpation of evil of its own sake, but the restoration of the balance of power in Europe. Without knowing it, we followed the course which has been charted by Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson, a course which Great Britain had followed for more than four centuries. From the beginning of the Republic, we have always regarded the dominance of Europe by one single power as a threat to the security of the United States, and however sentimentality and utopianism may have distorted the stark facts, of this power situation, and of this power interest, we have pursued this interest under the guise of crusading ideologies.5
Accordingly, one can extrapolate a few guidelines by translating this framework into policy. As a maritime power, the interest of the United States is to oppose the emergence of a hegemonic or expansionist empire in either Europe or Asia.
One hegemon uniting Europe or Asia will have enormous strategic depth, production capacity, manpower, and trade surplus, enough to challenge the United States, dwarf American production, threaten American trade routes and prosperity, and destabilize American relative power. A hegemon in Europe might choose to throw its weight behind China in order to isolate the United States; it may also work toward permanently eroding dollar hegemony and sanctions power. All of these developments would have second-order effects on U.S. security, even in the Western Hemisphere.
Washington continued this strategy post–Cold War. Opposing any nuclear proliferation was a pillar of U.S. grand strategy. As a 1992 strategic planning document argued: “Nuclear proliferation, if unchecked by superpower action, could tempt Germany, Japan, and other industrial powers to acquire nuclear weapons to deter attack from regional foes. This could start them down the road to global competition with the United States and, in a crisis over national interests, military rivalry.”6
Prior to World War II, in an era of functional multipolarity, similar to the one that has now reemerged, the U.S. strategic framework rested on temporary alignments and trade protectionism. The structural conditions of the postwar world resulted in the United States attempting to institutionalize peace in Europe and Asia, with multiple alliances. Given that the self-image of the United States is that of a republic and not an empire, American grand strategy started to face an increasingly curious contradiction. As Morgenthau wrote in Scientific Man versus Power Politics (1946), the rational grand strategy of a great power at times can be incompatible with democratic whims and passions.
The post–Cold War strategy of the United States also faced that particular contradiction, whereupon the American elite’s strategic instinct and desire to be the hegemon in Europe and Asia often came into conflict with the public’s desire to cut spending in foreign policy, as well as structural constraints such as growing debts.7 American actions have repeatedly demonstrated such inconsistency and incoherence. A recent example is U.S. leaders berating Europeans for military underspending, while scuttling any European attempts to create an indigenous, united military-industrial complex or buy European-made weapons.
On the question of nuclear strategy, however, a historical strategic consistency is visible. The United States, since the dawn of her hegemony, has opposed nuclear proliferation. During the late Cold War, the United States pursued a course of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union aimed at arms control, and immediately after the Cold War, in Ukraine and Europe, Washington worked to ensure that rogue elements did not take control of the Soviet arsenal spread across the post-Soviet space.8
As the United States was rapidly drawing down troops from Europe in the period of 1993–96, the situation gave rise to the question of U.S. extended deterrence. One of the rationales behind the move was to discourage European states from rushing toward independent deterrents.9 The current grand strategy, while different from arch-primacy, still mirrors that foundational principle, one which encourages a rapid drawing down of conventional troops, while maintaining the extended nuclear deterrence in place and discouraging nuclear proliferation.10
“Our transatlantic alliance has endured for decades. And we fully expect that it will be sustained for generations to come. But this won’t just happen,” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said in a speech in Brussels in February 2025. He added: “it will require our European allies to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the continent.11 The theme was repeated by Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby: “Germany is Europe’s largest economy, with a history of major contributions to NATO collective defense during the Cold War. It is vital and justified that Germany step up and lead in Europe’s conventional defense. . . . This includes accelerating the buildup of European conventional forces, capabilities, and industries to enable Europe to assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.”12
For the foreseeable future, the United States shall continue to keep the nuclear power and escalation threshold in American hands, with an extended deterrence umbrella firmly in place. It is evident that Washington would prefer to keep any nuclear proliferation in check, as has been U.S. policy for over eighty years, while pushing Europe to shoulder more of the continent’s conventional security burden.
It is obvious that there is a theoretical contradiction within the heart of America First grand strategy, to the extent that it is undefined. As noted, America is not designed to be an empire and is accordingly susceptible to the whims of public opinion. Simultaneously, both the elite and the public of the United States are reluctant to shoulder the necessary financial burden for imperialism or hegemony, while both desire to be the primus inter pares in an anarchic international system.
A compromise position in this grand strategy, therefore, requires the following policy: the United States must shift the majority of the conventional security burden to allies in order to cut costs and prevent imperial overstretch. Simultaneously, it needs to keep the nuclear escalation threshold under American control, discourage any chance of a mad dash toward more nuclear weapons, and start nuclear arms reduction talks with rivals, such as China and Russia.
The potential for true European hegemony is minimal, and the trends indicate that Europe in general—and the European Union in particular—is losing to the United States in economic competition. Europe remains internally divided and weighed down by bureaucratic inertia, a self-declared “regulatory superpower” that stifles innovation; it is also beset by structural challenges, such as low fertility, social decohesion, and rising centrifugal nationalist movements opposed to any further European consolidation.
American extended deterrence over European states should keep their desire for independent nuclear deterrence contained. For the Trump administration’s desired posture, bases in Turkey and Germany are sufficient, allowing the United States to provide extended deterrence over Europe and the Mediterranean. Washington can retrench from the other bases and operational theaters, while maintaining a “minimal credible deterrence” posture.
The Rise and Return of Near Peer Rivals
The rise of great power peers are a different concern. The United States is in an isolated position with regard to Chinese and Russian trust in the American nuclear posture. Consider that China and Russia have both signaled in joint statements that President Trump’s plan of building the Golden Dome missile shield would further destabilize relations between all.13
Meanwhile, Russia has announced that it would cease to implement any arms control agreements for as long as the United States is arming Ukraine.14 As recently as in February 2025, President Vladimir Putin said: “We and the United States have the question of prolonging New start. Probably everyone else has forgotten, but I remember it is going out of force in about a year, in February 2026,” a marked hint for those who are prudent enough to notice.15 Moscow has also linked arms control talks to the contingency of an active proxy conflict where per international law, the United States might be considered a cobelligerent. The Russian side has also refused to engage in any nuclear arms-related discussion since the start of the conflict in Ukraine.
The nuclear parity between Russia and the United States holds, but the Chinese side is steadily increasing its arsenal, risking an all-out nuclear arms race. Beijing’s warheads and delivery systems are supposed to touch around fifteen hundred by 2035, reaching the current deployed warhead status of both the United States and Russia.16 To this may be added China’s naval buildup, its dollar-proofing of its economy, construction of grain silos, and gold buying spree. China is also rapidly modernizing its delivery systems.17
While both the United States and Russia have enormous reserves of over five thousand warheads, the risk of a spiral is ever present due to a third external factor, a security dilemma between the United States and China. Forced to confront a more aggressive Beijing, the United States might bring back warheads that are currently in reserve, or deploy more missiles and subsurface platforms, which will exceed limits decided with Russia, thus sparking a classic case of miscommunication of intent, along with an arms race. It is important to remember in this context that the early Cold War was a period of extreme nuclear brinkmanship, and only after bilateral negotiations and nonproliferation treaties did the dynamic stabilize. The United States has little direct negotiation with China outside of a multilateral comprehensive test ban framework. The Chinese side has shown no interest in negotiating either, as they are enjoying a tactical alignment with Russia.
A New Great Power Concert and Equilibrium
An America First foreign policy and nuclear strategy must lean into the two chief instincts displayed by this administration: striking a balance between nuclear preponderance and nuclear stability; and a great power “collusion” between the United States, Russia, and China, which would include arms reduction talks and grand bargains.18
The Trump administration has already tied a grand bargain with Russia to an attempt to organize a new security architecture in Europe. This is a smart move. Russia and China are not natural allies, and exploiting their differences starts with satiating some of Russia’s strategic grievances, such as putting a stop to NATO enlargement, and rolling back some of America’s forward presence.
American retrenchment from Europe is another topic that might be of interest to Russia: it could push them toward future strategic arms reduction talks. The United States can institutionalize operational changes in its posture in Europe, involving a reduction of warheads and removal of strategic weapons from the European mainland to bases in the Arctic or the Pacific. As previously mentioned, the nuclear bases in Germany and Turkey are strategically sufficient for the United States to provide extended deterrence over Europe; the rest of the bases can close down or be transferred to the Europeans.
The United States could also encourage the formation of a joint command between Britain and France to keep their strategic assets as a second-tier pole of deterrence over the rest of Europe. This would achieve two aims at once: addressing European fears of nuclear abandonment; and bringing European partners into multilateral talks with Moscow and Washington, thereby reducing the chances of future nuclear brinkmanship. Moving away from static deterrence and focusing more on subsurface patrolling capacity would also enhance U.S. deterrence against both China and Russia.
A parallel negotiation with China should depend on what the ultimate direction of an America First foreign policy will be. There is as yet no clarity as to the ultimate aim of the Trump administration in dealing with China: are tariffs on China meant to isolate and coerce Beijing, or to get it to correct its unfair trade practices? There are also tariffs, however, on those states (i.e., allies in the European Union, Canada, India, Japan, the United Kingdom) that Washington may need if it is indeed set on putting pressure on China.
One is not sure which is true, but the difference between the end goal of coercion and that of correction would entail different nuclear policies. If the former is the aim, then that logically implies China is a rival. All levers of national power, therefore, should be geared toward preventing China’s rise to peer status, including sanctioning Chinese nuclear buildup and isolating Russia from China, as well as pushing for more trade alignment with the EU against China.
The revealed preference of this administration, however, suggests that the aim is great power collusion, and not competition.19 That implies that China, much like Russia, is a strategic competitor that can be negotiated with and that Washington, ultimately, isn’t willing to be engaged in a do-or-die spiral with Beijing. The United States will compete in spheres when needed and aim toward strategic independence from Chinese supply chains, while still keeping alive the chances of a peaceful global coexistence between the two poles.20
Naturally, any nuclear negotiations with China must reflect that reality: it should focus on arms control and joint pledges on deployment limits, including warheads and types of platforms. The United States should initiate tripartite talks with China and Russia on hypersonic delivery systems, artificial intelligence, and fractional orbital bombardment capabilities, all cutting-edge technologies that together could make current deterrence theories obsolete.21 Congressional ratification for any such treaty will be difficult, but not impossible. In any event, foreign policy negotiation is a presidential prerogative and may serve as a good start for long-term trust building arcs with Moscow and Beijing.
Diplomacy and Deterrence
Nuclear policies are not an end in itself, but mere tools in the service of a great power’s grand strategy. The American public has repeatedly, when given a choice electorally, opposed liberal interventionism, nation-building, and wars of choice—reflected in its ultimate form in the election of Donald Trump (twice). The rise of China, the return of Russia to imperial form, exhaustion with spending in defense of foreign borders, and the decline in the relative power of the United States have all reinforced the move toward retrenchment.
Multipolarity is inherently unstable and begs for realism, restraint, and prudence, as the chances of survival after costly misadventures are lower for a great power than under unipolarity.22 The president’s policy stances in favor of higher defense spending enjoy broad support. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the United States will simply give up its predominant position across the globe and remain content with being a hemispheric power. That said, American security and survival will depend upon a grand strategy that seeks some form of equilibrium with rival great powers.
The United States should permanently block any further enlargement of any alliance over which it has extended deterrence: this would signal good faith to Moscow and Beijing. Simultaneously, even a pared down U.S. nuclear umbrella over Germany and Turkey would reestablish continuity and calm European nerves—and discourage a European rush toward proliferation. Amplifying European conventional power and tactical independence while discouraging proliferation will be the key challenge of the near future.
The risk of Chinese hegemony on the other hand is arguably limited, given China’s challenging geographical position and neighborhood. The United States is party to robust regional security alignments, such as the Quad and AUKUS, while China is surrounded by strongly nationalistic neighbors that are themselves rising economic powers. Any chance of a Chinese bid for hegemony would spur a natural counterbalancing coalition. “To put it bluntly: Washington is not going to conquer China or dictate its political future. Nor can Beijing hope to do the same to the United States,” Stephen Walt wrote, “coexistence between the two states is not merely desirable; it is unavoidable.”23
Finally, careful diplomacy will be necessary as the administration seeks to limit the number of nuclear weapons. Washington’s rhetoric should not push allies, such as Germany or South Korea, to build or expand their arsenal, nor should it push Moscow and Beijing to align in opposition to U.S. nuclear arms reduction aims. Diplomacy must go hand in hand with deterrence; these are two distinct but complementary approaches which together can accomplish the work of promoting peace and stability in a multipolar world.
This article originally appeared in American Affairs Volume IX, Number 4 (Winter 2025): 169–78.
Notes
1 Guardian staff, “Trump Proposes Nuclear Deal with Russia and China to Halve Defense Budgets,” Guardian, February 13, 2025.
2 Rose Gottemoeller, “Arms Control Is Not Dead Yet,” Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2025.
3 Amy B. Wang and Dan Lamothe, “Trump Says U.S. Has Chosen Plan for ‘Golden Dome’ Missile Defense System,” Washington Post, May 24, 2025.
4 Agence France-Presse, “Putin Backs Trump’s Proposal for US, China and Russia to Halve Defence Spending,” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2025.
5 See: Hans J. Morgenthau, “Germany, the Political Problem,” in Germany and the Future of Europe, ed. Hans J. Morgenthau (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).
6 Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Ensuring No Rivals Develop,” New York Times, March 8, 1992.
7 For detailed accounts of the U.S. dash to global hegemony, see: Stephen Wertheim, Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020); A.G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).
8 For further details, see: Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control, 1949–2021,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed June 18, 2025; Daryl Kimball and staff, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, October 2022.
9 Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Ensuring No Rivals Develop.” Additionally, see: National Security Council staff, “Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994–1999,” National Security Council, April 16 1992.
10 For a detailed outline of the rationale behind the current American grand strategy in Europe, see: Sumantra Maitra, “The Best NATO Is a Dormant NATO,” Foreign Affairs, November 4, 2024.
11 Pete Hegseth, “Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered)” (speech, Brussels, Belgium, February 12, 2025), U.S. Department of Defense.
12 Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby (@USDPColby), “This includes accelerating the buildup of European conventional forces, capabilities, and industries to enable Europe to assume primary responsibility. . . . ,” X, May 6, 2025.
13 See: Reuters staff, “Kremlin Suggests ‘Golden Dome’ Could Lead to Resumption of Russia-U.S. Arms Control Contacts,” Reuters, May 21, 2025; Reuters staff, “China ‘Seriously Concerned’ over US Golden Dome Defence System,” Reuters, May 21, 2025; Agence France-Presse, “Kremlin Walks Back Criticism of Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Missile Defense Plan,” Moscow Times, May 21, 2025.
14 Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New Start Arms Control Today,” Arms Control Today, March 2023.
15 Gottemoeller, “Arms Control Is Not Dead Yet.”
16 Hans M. Kristensen, et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 81, no. 2 (2025).
17 No great power takes these steps unless they are at least preparing for some form of long-term conflict. See: Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 5, 2024; Reuters staff, “China Raises 2025 Budget for Grain Stockpiling, Targets Higher Domestic Output,” Reuters, March 6, 2025; Reuters staff, “Exclusive: China’s Central Bank Asks State Lenders to Reduce Dollar Purchases, Sources Say,” Reuters, April 9, 2025; Yihui Xie, “China Gold Imports Surge to 11-Month High Despite Record Prices,” Bloomberg, May 20, 2025.
18 For a detailed thesis on why the current U.S. administration is moving away from great power competition and toward a great power concert or collusion, see: Stacie E. Goddard, “The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition: Trump’s New Spheres of Influence,” Foreign Affairs 104, no. 3 (May/June 2025): 8–23.
19 Goddard, “The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition.”
20 For an overview, listen to: Rose Gottemoeller, “Owen Harries Lecture: US-Russia-China, the Nuclear Triumvirate of the 21st Century” (lecture, Sydney, Australia, March 24, 2025), Lowy Institute.
21 Gottemoeller, “Arms Control Is Not Dead Yet.”
22 It is outside the scope of this short essay to go on a tangential discussion on great power behavior within a multipolar order. But broadly speaking, just as with the Concert of Europe, a great power concert in our times would need a perception of equality between the great powers, as well as tempered revolutionary instinct regardless of the actual relative power of each. Accordingly, a new great power concert between the three largest nuclear powers would require, at a minimum, forums which would have inbuilt “confidence-building measures” between the three, in addition to regular hotlines, discussion channels, and well-defined redlines.
23 Stephen M. Walt, “Hedging on Hegemony: The Realist Debate over How to Respond to China,” International Security 49, no. 4 (Spring 2025): 37–70.
