2 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
3 Karl Evers-Hillstrom, “Lobbying Spending Reaches $3.4 Billion in 2018, Highest in 8 Years,” OpenSecrets News, January 25, 2019.
4 Lee Fang, “Where Have All the Lobbyists Gone?,” Nation, February 19, 2014.
5 Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr., “Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1 (2003): 105–30.
6 The following discussion is based on Cornelia Woll, “Politics in the Interest of Capital: A Not-So-Organized Combat,” Politics and Society 44, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 373–91.
7 Mark S. Mizruchi, The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
8 Michael Useem, The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gerald F. Davis and Mark S. Mizruchi, “The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U.S. System of Corporate Governance,” Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 215–39; Johan S. G. Chu and Gerald F. Davis, “Who Killed the Inner Circle? The Decline of the American Corporate Interlock Network,” American Journal of Sociology 122, no. 3 (November 1, 2016): 714–54.
9 Mark A. Smith, American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
10 Pepper D. Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
11 Holly Brasher, Vital Statistics on Interest Groups and Lobbying (CQ Press, 2014).
12 Matt Grossmann, “Interest Group Influence on US Policy Change: An Assessment Based on Policy History,” Interest Groups and Advocacy 1, no. 2 (October 2012): 180.
13 Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009).
14 Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012).
15 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 03 (September 2014): 575.
16 Jason W. Ridge, Amy Ingram, and Aaron D. Hill, “Beyond Lobbying Expenditures: How Lobbying Breadth and Political Connectedness Affect Firm Outcomes,” Academy of Management Journal 60, no. 3 (June 2017):
17 See, e.g., Robert A. Brady, Business as a System of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943); Fred Block, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule,” Socialist Revolution 7, no. 3 (1977): 6–28; Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
18 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 45.
19 Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (London: Pinter, 1988), 31.
20 See Pepper D. Culpepper, “Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era,” Business and Politics 17, no. 3 (October 2015): 391–409.
21 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (New York: Verso Books, 2014).
22 Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond, “Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives,” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 147–67; Peter A. Gourevitch, “Afterword: Yet More Hard Times? Reflections on the Great Recession in the Frame of Earlier Hard Times,” in Politics in the New Hard Times: The Great Recession in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013).
23 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000).
24 Paul Pierson, “Power in Historical Institutionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, ed. Tulia G. Falleti, Adam Sheingate, and Orfeo Fioretos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 131.
25 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States,” Politics & Society 38, no. 2 (January 6, 2010): 170.
26 Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.
27 Bruno Amable, “Institutional Complementarity and Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation and Production,” Review of International Political Economy 7, no. 4 (2000): 645–687; Martin Höpner, “What Have We Learnt?: Complementarity, Coherence and Institutional Change,” Socio-Economic Review 3, no. 2 (2005): 383–87; Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes, and Mark Thatcher, eds., Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich, “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (2009): 449–82.
28 Lawrence Jacobs and Desmond King, Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
29 See, e.g., Vincent Reinhart, “A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 1 (2011): 71–90.
30 Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York: Vintage Books, 2011).
31 Cornelia Woll, The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014).
32 In a recent survey, 63 percent of respondents overall agreed with this sentence, 54 percent of those that identify as liberal, and 74 percent that identify as conservative. Forbes, “JUST Capital and Forbes Announce Partnership to Collaborate on Research Based on Corporate Behavior,” Forbes Corporate Communications, November 4, 2016.
33 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” in Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance, ed. Walther Ch Zimmerli, Markus Holzinger, and Klaus Richter (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 173–78.
34 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State : Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie 25, no. 2 (1984): 185–213.
35 Benjamin Braun, “Central Banking and the Infrastructural Power of Finance: The Case of ECB Support for Repo and Securitization Markets,” Socio-Economic Review, 2018.
36 Pepper D. Culpepper and Kathleen Thelen, “It’s Hard to Unplug from the Matrix: Consumers and the Politics of Platform Power” (unpublished manuscript, 2019).
37 Isabel O’Brien, “American Antitrust: Ill-Equipped to Deal with Big Tech?,” The Quarterly: Sciences Po’s Undergraduate Economics Magazine, April 8, 2019.
38 Kadhim Shubber, “US Antitrust Enforcement Falls to Slowest Rate since 1970s,” Financial Times, November 28, 2018.
39 “Corporate Concentration,” Economist, March 24, 2016.
40 See David Dayen, “This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies,” The Nation, April 4, 2017; Carl Shapiro, “Antitrust in a Time of Populism,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 61 (November 2018): 714–48.
41 Richard Blumenthal and Tim Wu, “What the Microsoft Antitrust Case Taught Us,” New York Times, June 9, 2018.
42 Lina M. Khan, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” Yale Law Journal 126, no. 3 (January 2017): 564–907.
43 Ben Brody, “Ted Cruz Echoes Elizabeth Warren’s Criticism of Facebook’s Power,” Bloomberg, March 12, 2019.
44 David Autor et al., “The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms,” NBER Working Paper (2017).
45 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “The New Interdependence Approach: Theoretical Development and Empirical Demonstration,” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 5 (September 2, 2016): 713–36.
46 Henry J. Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence,” International Security, forthcoming 2019.