2 For an excellent analysis of the rise of venture capital in the United States, see William Lazonick, “The New Economy Business Model and the Crisis of U.S. Capitalism,” Capitalism and Society 4, no. 2 (2009): 1–70.
3 Christopher Mims, “Humanity’s Last Great Hope: Venture Capitalists,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2014.
4 For more about venture capital as patient capital, and how venture capital works, see Robyn Klingler-Vidra, “When Venture Capital Is Patient Capital: Seed Funding as a Source of Patient Capital for High-Growth Companies,” Socio-Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2016): 691–708.
5 Policymakers’ ability to choose distinct forms of VC tax policy should not be construed as a clear triumph of state power over markets. VC tax policies—be it tax credits, lower rates, or exemptions—all represent different forms of policymakers’ reduced taxation of the VC industry. Although they choose distinct forms, policymakers are choosing among various ways to concede their tax proceeds. They either reduce tax rates for a broad category of investment or give tax credits to VC investors. In this sense, policymakers respond to competitive pressures by studying different ways in which they can minimize, rather than increase, their tax revenue from VC activity in order to promote, not constrain, VC.
6 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap, 1962).
7 Manhong Mannie Liu, “Growing the Venture Dragon: China,” Coller Venture Review 2 (2015): 112–22.
8 Linas Sabaliauskas, “Seeding a Venture Wolf: The Baltics,” Coller Venture Review 2 (2015): 124–30.
9 Robyn Klingler-Vidra, Martin Kenney, and Dan Breznitz, “Policies for Financing Entrepreneurship through Venture Capital: Learning from the Successes of Israel and Taiwan,” International Journal of Innovation and Regional Development 7, no. 3 (2016): 203–21.
10 Christopher Gulinello, “Engineering a Venture Capital Market and the Effects of Government Control on Private Ordering: Lessons from the Taiwan Experience,” George Washington International Law Review 37, no. 4 (2005): 845–83.
11 See Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed—and What to Do about It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
12 Robyn Klingler-Vidra, The Venture Capital State: The Silicon Valley Model in East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).
13 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.
14 For Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s seminal work on bounded rationality, see Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,” Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973): 207–32, and “Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment,” Psychological Review 90 (1983): 293–315.
15 See Kurt Weyland, Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
16 The term “conventional rationality” is used to refer to “full,” “calculated,” “complete,” and “instrumental” rationality, though the author acknowledges differences between these terms, particularly that instrumental rationality has a focus on cost. For delineation of “alternative rationalities,” see James G. March, “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice,” Bell Journal of Economics 9, no. 2 (1978): 587–608. For conceptualizations of rationalities attributed to Simon’s broad category of “bounded rationality” (including global rationality and procedural rationality), see Gustavo Barros, “Herbert A. Simon and the Concept of Rationality: Boundaries and Procedures,” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 30, no. 3 (2010): 455–72. For an exploration of the treatment of several forms of rationality in organization studies, see Barbara Townley, Reason’s Neglect: Rationality and Organizing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).